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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW
Admissibility of Confessions. State v. Moore1 recently held that
only two proper grounds exist for excluding a confession from evidence
in a criminal trial: That it was obtained in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution or that
it has not met the test provided by Washington statute.2 The Wash-
ington Constitution provides that, "no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to give evidence against himself . . ."' But the
court held that this provision does not apply to the admissibility of
confessions. The defendant had been convicted of second degree
burglary and grand larceny. He sought reversal on the ground that,
since he did not testify, admission of his confessions violated the
self-incrimination provision.
The thesis of this note is briefly this: Cases prior to Moore held
that the self-incrimination provision of the state constitution is
identical in substance with that of the federal constitution. Since the
basic test of a good confession in the federal courts is the self -incrimin-
ation provision, there is an inconsistency in the court's holdings.
Secondly, the Washington statute on confessions4 conflicts with the
federal due process clause and with the Washington self-incrimination
provision (if interpreted as is the analogous federal provision).
Finally, it appears that the test for a confession under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause is practically the same as that used
under the federal self-incrimination provision.
Before Moore was decided, the Washington court had not made it
clear whether the state self-incrimination provision applied to the
admissibility of confessions. In the principal case the court cited State
promise to abandon non-conforming use of property in a zoned area. The county
refrained from alternate remedies during the period of non-conforming use. The
court enforced the promise when the promisor later failed to comply with the zoning
law as promised.
The forbearance question arose in Pennsylvania, Twilley v. Pennypack Woods
Home Ownership Ass'n, 180 Pa.Super. 20, 117 A.2d 788 (1955). To a promise to a
tenant that he could remain on the premises the court felt forbearance by the tenant
in the form of failure to make plans to move was not definite and substantial.
1 160 Wash. Dec. 145, 372 P.2d 536 (1962).
2 RCW 10.58.030: "CONFESSION AS EViDENCE. The confession of a defendant made
under inducement, with all the circumstances, may be given as evidence against him,
except when made under the influence of fear produced by threats; but a confession
made under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating
testimony."
3 WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
4 Note 2 supra.
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v. Winters' and State v. Johnson' for the proposition that it did not.
In State v. Winters, the appellant unsuccessfully argued that RCW
10.58.030 contravenes the self-incrimination provision. The court
there stated that since the statute excludes confessions "when made
under the influence of fear produced by threats" it would not overturn
the statute. This implies that WASH. CONST. art. 1,,§ 9 imposes some
restriction on the admissibility of confessions. Later in its opinion,
however, the court said that this state has no constitutional or statu-
tory provision concerning the use of confessions as evidence except
RCW 10.58.030. A year after Winters, State v. Dildine held that
failure to advise the defendant of his right to keep silent does not
violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Even though
the defendant's right had not been violated the court did recognize that
this right pertains to the admissibility of confessions. An early case,
State v. Washing,8 used both RCW 10.58.030 and WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 9 in determining that certain statements were admissible -into
evidence. Although the cases are confusing, State v. Moore' indicates
that the state constitution's privilege against self-incrimination affords
protection to the defendant only during his trial.
The interpretation given this privilege is surprising in light of the
court's normal treatment of the relationship between federal and state
constitutional rights:
The Washington court has applied this general proposition specifi-
In a series of cases commencing with State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435,,
70 Pac. 34 (1902), this court has adhered to the rule that where the
language of the state constitution is similar to that of the Federal con-
stitution, the language of the state constitutional provision should
receive the same definition and interpretation as that which has been
given to the like provision in the Federal constitution by the United
States supreme court.10
539 Wn.2d 545, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951).
0 53 Wn.2d 666, 355 P.2d 809 (1959). The court merely quoted the Winters case
without comment.
7 41 Wn.2d 614, 250 P.2d 951 (1952). See State v. Haynes, 58 Wn.2d 716, 264 P.2d
935 (1961) ; State v. Benson, 58 Wn.2d 490, 364 P.2d 220 (1961) ; State v. Wilson,
68 Wash. 464, 123 Pac. 795 (1912). In the Haynes case, the court considered the due
process clause in the state constitution in determining the admissibility of a confession.8 36 Wash. 485, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904). See State v. Clark, 21 Wn.2d 774, 153 P.2d
297 (1944).
9 160 Wash. Dec. 145, 372 P.2d 536 (1962).
10 State v. Schoel, 54 Wn.2d 388, 391, 341 P2d 481, 482 (1959). Accord, State v.
Lei, 59 Wn2d 1, 365 P.2d 698 (1961) ; Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wn2d 460, 335 P.2d
10 (1959) ; City of Bremerton v. Smith, 31 Wn.2d 788, 794, 199 P2d 95, 98 (1948)
(dissenting opinion) ; State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922) ; State v.
Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 34 (1902).
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cally to WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 9." In spite of the argument in State
v. Sckoel' that Washington has the right, if not the duty, to make its
own interpretation of the state constitution, the court there adopted
the position of the United States Supreme Court.' Similarly, to de-
termine whether a statement made by the defendant before a magis-
trate at a preliminary hearing was properly admitted into evidence, the
case of State v. Washing 4 applied the federal fifth amendment case of
Wilson v. United States.5
In Brain v. United States,6 the United States Supreme Court said:
In criminal trials, in courts of the United States, whenever a ques-
tion arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary,
the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the
constitution of the United States commanding that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'-
This has been the rule throughout the history of the Court." The
protection given by the self-incrimination provision makes invalid any
confession given as a result of an inducement engendering either hope
or fear. The provision will not allow a person to be made a deluded
instrument of his own conviction. Any interference that restricts this
freedom will invalidate the confession. The type of influence is not
determinative, even though it may relate to the reliability of the con-
fession. Consequently, a confession obtained by trickery or inducement
of hope violates the self-incrimination provision just as much as does a
confession obtained by force or threat of force, although the first kind of
confession is probably more reliable. Consequently, RCW 10.58.030 is
inconsistent with the self-incrimination provision, because the statute
specifically allows confessions to be admitted into evidence if they
11 State v. James, 36 Wn.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950). "The provisions quoted
from the constitution of this state WASH. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, afford appellant the
same protection that he could claim under the Federal Constitution." Id. at 897, 221
P.2d at 491. Accord, State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948). "The latter
portion of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and Article
1, § 9 of the constitution of this state; give to the individuals the same protection.:*
Id. at 926, 190 P.2d at 743.
12 54 Wn.2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
13 Brief for Respondent, p. 66, State v. Schoel, 54 Wn.2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
14 36 Wash. 485, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904).
15 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
16 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
17 Id. at 542.
18 United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951) ; Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) ; Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) ; Hardy v.
United States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896)
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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are the result of inducements other than fear."9 The statute is designed
to prevent unreliable confessions from being admitted, for it prohibits
confessions induced by fear and requires a confession made by an
inducement of any sort to be corroborated. But no Washington case
has noted this inconsistency. Cases have avoided the issue,2° with the
exception of State v. Winters,2 ' which decided that the statute was not
unconstitutional. In the Brainm 2 case, after a discussion of the protec-
tion afforded by the fifth amendment, the Court said that most state
courts follow the general rule that the confession must be freely de-
termined. Then it cited an Indiana statute" as an exception to the
general rule. In other words, the Indiana statute, which is almost the
same as the Washington statute, is inconsistent with the self-incri-
mination provision of the United States Constitution. Since the fifth
amendment was not then applied to the states, the Indiana statute was
not declared unconstitutional. However, if the self-incrimination pro-
vision in the Washington Constitution is interpreted as is the fifth
amendment, then RCW 10.58.030 contravenes WASH. CONST.
art. 1, § 9.
The Washington statute is also inconsistent with the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, which allows a state court to admit a
confession into evidence only if it has been "freely self-determined.)"2 4
The test does not depend upon the reliability of the confession but
upon whether interrogating officers overcame the defendant's will to
resist.25 In Rogers v. Richmond,"8 the interrogating officers, within
19 See State v. Thompson, 38 Wn2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951) ; State v. Clark, 21
Wn.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944). The court in the Thompson case stated; "the general
rule, supported by the weight of authority, appears to be that the use of artifice-even
trickery or fraud in inducing a confession, will not alone render the confession in-
admissible in evidence." 38 Wn.2d at 783, 232 P2d at 93.
20 State v. Clark, 21 Wn2d 774, 153 P.2d 297 (1944) ; State v. Washing, 36 Wash.
485, 78 Pac. 1019 (1904).
2139 Wn.2d 545, 236 P2d 1038 (1951).
22 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
23 R~v. ST. IND. 1894, § 1871: "The confession of a defendant made under induce-
ment, with all the circumstances, may be given in evidence against him, except when
made under the influence of fear, produced by threats; but a confession made under
inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating testimony."
Compare with RCW 10.58.030, note 1 supra.
24 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).
25 Townsend v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct. 745 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond. 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Stevens, Confessions and
Crimnal Procedure-A Proposal, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 542, 545 (1959) ; Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Lee v. Mississippi
332 U.S. 742 (1948); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) ; Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
20 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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hearing of the defendant, pretended to order the defendant's wife
brought in for questioning. They also told him he would be less than a
man if he failed to confess. Although the trial judge found that the
confession was admissible because the trick by the officers had no
tendency to produce a confession that was not reliable, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction because the trial court had used the
wrong standard in determining whether the confession was voluntary.
If the trial court in Washington uses the statutory standard for determ-
ining the admissibility of a confession, then its decision too may be
overturned, because the inducement allowed by the statute may be
sufficient to overcome the defendant's will to resist."
The test for determining the validity of a confession under the
federal due process clause appears to be merging with the test for
determining the validity of a confession under the federal self -incrimin-
ation provision. In Brown v. Mississippi28 a confession obtained
through use of physical brutality failed the due process test because the
method of acquiring it offended a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."' 9 The fundamental principle, at this point, has two facets:
a confession must be reliable, and law enforcement officers must be
made to obey the law they are sworn to uphold. The Court specifically
stated that exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the states
was not secured by the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, that
part of a person's right to privacy was not guaranteed by the federal
constitution.30 Since deciding Brown, however, the Court has reversed
state convictions even where the method used to extract the confession
neither violated state law nor rendered the confession unreliable."' The
rationale of these subsequent decisions is that due process also forbids
a defendant to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction
through a confession unfairly extracted. One of these cases, Culombe
- "Ours is an accusational and not an inquisitional system-a system in which the
State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth." Id. at 541.
28 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), which held
that coercion can be mental as well as physical.
29 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
30 See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948). "The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in the 'concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 27.
31 Townsend v. Sain, 83 Sup. Ct. 745 (1963) ; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.




v. Connecticut,2 set out this test for the admissibility of a confession
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained*
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess; it may be used"
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity
for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his'confession
offends due process.' 3
Compare with this test the very similar requirement under the fifth
amendment, namely,, that "the confession be made freely, voluntarily,
and without compulsion or inducement of any sort." 4
In conclusion, the test for the admissibility of confession would be
virtually the same whether the Washington court used the self-incri-
mination provision of the state constitution (interpreted in accordance
with the analogous provision of the federal constitution) or the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In either case the te'st
would preclude the use of RCW 10.58.030.
MICTHAEL D. GARVEY"
Double Jeopardy. In State v. Connors,' the Washington State .St-
preme Court held that a defendant had been placed in jeopardy when,
sua sponte, a trial court erroneously declared a mistrial over his objec-
tion. A later retrial of the defendant therefore constituted double
jeopardy.
At the first trial a jury had been 'impaneled and. sworn to try the
defendant. No opening statements had been made, and no evidence
'had been introduced. Although the defendant had not consented to
a separation of the jury, several members of the jury separated them-
selves from the rest of the panel during the noon recess. This fact
was called to the attention of counsel, and the defendant consented
to a separation of the rest of the jurors for the remainder of the recess.
Afterwards, on its own motion, the court declared a mistrial over a
timely objection by the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant was
tried and convicted of an identical charge, over his objection based
on double jeopardy.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. The court held (1) that the
mistrial had been improperly granted, and, (2) that the second trial
32367 U.S. 568 (1961).
33 Id. at 607.
34 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620 (1896).
3159 Wn.2d 879, 371 P.2d 541 (1962).
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